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Texte intégral 
This article is dedicated to the memory of Tahar Djouat writer and journalist, murdered in 
Algiers in June 1993. 
The assassination of Algerian intellectuals has shaken public opinion throughout the world. 
People have asked themselves how is it possible that knowledge and artistic creation can be 
attacked in the name of a political project, whatever it might be. But in Algeria, beyond the 
narrow circle of professional colleagues and close friends, these assassinations have not been 
counter-productive for the Islamists, whose communiques announce the execution of 
unbelievers. How is it that Algeria has become indifferent to the murder of its intellectuals? In 
order to explain this indifference, we need to make reference to the two types of intellectual 
bequeathed by the colonial experience: the francophone intellectual, separated off from the 
population, and the Arabic-speaking intellectual, who strongly identifies with that population. 
But before looking at this in detail, it is useful to consider the diverse contours of the figure of 
the intellectual, especially in two countries where they have played an important political and 
ideological role: Russia and France. 
The organic intellectual and the critical 
intellectual
Each national history produces its own political actors with different goals and different forms 
of action. This is why, across different countries and different cultures, there does not exist an 
ideal type of the intellectual. In other words, there is no such thing as the Standard 
intellectual. To give several illustrative examples: Russian society. faced with the process of 
modernization in the second half of the nineteenth century, saw the emergence of the 
nationalist organic intellectual who, along with his illusions and his faith in Utopia, believed 
that it was sufficient to be heard by - or to replace – the Prince. In this way, from the summit 
of the State, knowledge and the values of the avant-garde considered as expressing the 
aspirations of humanity for justice, equality, and so on, would flow down upon the backward 
masses. At the end of the nineteenth century the Russian intelligentsia became aware of the 
relative backwardness of their country, and hence embraced Marxism as a simultaneous 
critique of both state power and society. It was not simply a question of criticizing the 
absolutism of the Czar but also a matter of seizing power from him in order to modernize 
society and to create the people's state. The Russian intellectual opposed the existing political 
power in the name of an ideal contained within a political project. After the revolution of 
1917 he entered the service of the new state in order to put this project into concrete form. He 
was, then. an organic intellectual in the sense that his mission was not limited to a simple 
critique of power, since he chose to share in it. [2] This pattern, established over a hundred 
years ago, was reproduced once again with the process of perestroika in the 1980s.[3]
Very different from the Russian experience, the French situation also presents a paradigmatic 
example, where the intellectual, perceived as the heir of the Enlightenment and as critic of 
both state and society, is synonymous with a commitment to universal values. This type of 
intellectual appeared with great effect at the time of the Dreyfus Affair, but it did not date 
from this time, even if the word "intellectual" came into general use with the Dreyfus Affair. 
The writer hostile to power and the philosopher critical of society certainly predate this event, 
and Voltaire would be a good example of this. Power in France has always had to deal with 
the spirit of Voltaire. In general, the intellectual has been on the left, but there have obviously 
been intellectuals of a right-wing disposition: Raymond Aron, for example, was the same kind 
of intellectual but he was not on the left. 
The debate in France about the intellectual has for long been concerned, and in an obsessional 
manner, with what Julien Benda had already called by 1927 the treason of the intellectuals. 
[4] As an expression of critical judgement that appeared with the emergence of the social 
sciences, the intellectual in France has been distrustful of a state that has been suspected of 
absolutism. By the same token, he has always feared that his actions would be exploited in 
order to further strengthen the power of the State, perceived as an evil force driven by the 
temptation to encroach upon individual and public liberties, The worry of a Julien Benda, 
expressed in similar terms fifty years later by Regis Debray, is that Voltaire will become an 
organic intellectual, an accomplice to power; and hence the word treason. In general, the 
intellectual in France has been on the side of civil society. always attentive to the absolutist 
tendencies of power and ready to denounce them. The uneasiness of left-wing intellectuals 
during the 1980s - an unease given expression in the debate originated by then minister Max 
Gallo [5] - derived from their attitude towards the socialists in power. The intellectual in 
France embodies an anti-state counter-culture, but suddenly there was a state which, in its 
language, laid claim to the values of justice, equality, and so on. As a result, something 
previously unseen occurred: intellectuals of a right-wing disposition adopted a critical and 
oppositional stance towards the State whilst the intellectual of the Left became "voiceless". 
The Algerian intellectualism and the 
colonial situation
What has this to do with Algeria? As the historical situation is different, so the problem is 
posed in a different way. Indeed, to understand the specific characteristics of the Algerian 
situation we need to return to that history. Algeria is the contradictory product of a 
colonization which was a system based upon the complete exclusion of the vast majority of 
Algerians. This system did not alllow the discussion of ideas and could not be influenced by 
the confrontation of ideas, and from this was derived the political weakness of the intellectual 
who was incapable of influencing the course of events. The intellectual elite - and by this is 
meant all those educated people capable of delivering either a written or oral message in 
which political or social ideas are expressed - was composed of both a French-speaking 
element and an Arab-speaking element. These two components of the elite, although they had 
the same social origins, did not convey the same political and social message, did not have the 
same attitude towards the colonial system and did not therefore have the same image of 
society to defend. This division within the elite took shape under colonization and did not 
diminish with independence; on the contrary, it tended to become further accentuated. 
In the colonial situation, the person of French education did not have the social prestige of the 
intellectual in France, someone who is capable of haviag an impact upon public opinion. He 
was respected in his local neighbourhood because of his personal success, but at a political 
level his neigbbourhood was wary of him because he was suspected of wishing to reproduce 
or to defend the colonial system whose culture he knew and from which he personally 
profited. The French-speaking intellectual was perceived as belonging to the colonial camp, 
especially as very often he was married to either a pied-noir or a French woman he had met 
while being a student. This impression was not completely false, because, impregnated with 
French culture, he was fascinated by the ideas of the eighteenth Century. However, for him 
colonization was a personal affront on two counts: it injured Algeria, his homeland, but it also 
injured the image that he had of France. He condemned the colonial system as being 
unworthy of the France of 1789 and denied the colonial settler the right to lay claim to 
Robespierre and Saint-Just. He tried to explain to his fellow countrymen that the colonial 
system was not France, but he did not succeed in convincing them. He had a "positivist" (in 
the nineteenth-century meaning of the word) outlook on his society, deploring its sociological 
archaisms. He was critical of its patriarchal ideology, the relationship between father aod son, 
and of the position of women, in the latter case regretting their social backwardness and 
passivity (which gave rise to his choice of a French woman as wife). At a subjective level, he 
remained attached to his homeland through his mother, for whom he felt deep affection. But 
politically he was drawn to the French model of social relations. The ambiguity of the 
francophone intellectual has its origin in this stark division: attracted to France, he remained 
deeply attached to the cultural sensibilities of his country. 
At a political level, he was not well organized but, on becoming a nationalist, he sided with 
the reformist movement led by Ferhat Abbas. The latter, a pharmacy graduate of the Sorbonne 
in 1919 and married to a French woman, called for gradual reforms which, in time, would 
lead to independence, whilst respecting a French cultural heritage that was perceived as an 
object of value and in a positive light. [6] It is this political position that explains the weak 
levels of support from amongst the popular classes enjoyed by the party of Ferhat Abbas, the 
Union Démocratique pour le Manifeste Algérien (UDMA). For the greater proportion of 
Algerians colonization was France and its culture; worse still, modernity itself was 
assimilated to French colonization. Thus, the manner in which Algeria was colonised 
determined the attitude of Algerians towards modernity and this attitude would have 
consequences, especially after independence. 
It is from this that derives the importance of the oulamâ or Muslim cleric as the principal 
competitor to the francophone intellectual. His religious discourse stands as a defence of 
tradition against the cultural aggression of modernity. It is not therefore by chance that 
nationalist doctrine - which in turn inspired the nationalist movement and later the 
independent state — was to be the work of these Muslim clerics who utilized the cultural 
patrimony of the past to block the advance of modernity which, in their view, stood accused 
of justifying colonialism. Already under colonialism, therefore, there existed two types of 
Algerian intellectual: one, the francophone, imbued with French culture, critical of both the 
colonial system and of the social structure of the traditional society from which he originated; 
the other, the arabophone, concentrating on questions of culture and finding in religion the 
resources to oppose French ideological influence and colonial domination. The credibility of 
the language of one or the other amongst the masses was clearly determined by their 
respective attitudes to the colonial system. 
When the insurrection began in 1954, the francophone intellectual finished up by siding with 
the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN), which conferred upon him administrative 
organizational tasks. No intellectual became part of the leadership of the Front de Libération 
Nationale/Armée de Libération Nationale (FLN/ALN). More telling still, Ait Hamouda, alias 
Colonel Amirouche, leader of one of the six FLN commands (wilaya III), had hundreds of 
maquisards who spoke French executed on the grounds that amongst them would have been 
traitors who informed the French army about the movements of the ALN. Amirouche was 
able to proceed with this purge, known under the name of bleuïte or protection from double 
agents, because of the anti-intellectual sentiments found in the FLN in particular and amongst 
the popuIation in general. 
After independence, the two types of intellectual opposed each other on the question of 
development. The francophone wanted to utilize the State in order to resolve the country's 
economic and social problems; the arabophone wanted to invigorate the country's language 
and religion in order to revive its Arabic-IsIamic cultural heritage. Similarly, by force of 
circurmstances, the francophone intellectual was at one and the same time both organic, in the 
Russian sense that he deified the State, and critical, in the French sense that he attacked the 
forms and structures of traditional society from a perspective of developmcnt. Conversely, the 
arabophone intellectual was hostile towards the State but a defender of a society that he 
wished to extract from what was frequently described in stereotypical language as "the 
cultural and political perversion introduced by the West". 
The competition between francophones and 
arabophones
As has already been indicated, the situation of the intellectual in Algeria has distinctive 
features that derive from the history of the country and from the conditions through which its 
society was drawn into the process of modernization and confronted political modemity. 
Profoundly destructured by a colonial population settlement that lasted for over a century, in 
the days following its independence Algeria had to face a series of cultural problems that 
related to its national identity, as well as social and economic problems whose solution would 
be found through development. This set of different problems expressed itself through 
divisions within its elite, the francophone section emphasizing economic development to 
address social issues like unemployment, illiteracy, population growth and malnutrition, 
whilst the arabophone section were preoccupied with the consolidation of Arabic-Islamic 
cultural identity. [7] These two sections of the elite had always coexisted within the 
nationalist movement under colonialism and were both present in the apparatus of the State at 
the point of independence, each connected by compromises from which strategic 
considerations were not absent in either camp. But, paradoxically, whilst it was assumed that 
independence would bring them together and serve to create a new elite, it pushed them 
further apart and even set them against each other. [8]
On one side, the arabophones, close to the people at the level of culture, pursued their utopian 
dream of reviving the pre-colonial cultural past, whilst on the other, the francophones, 
attracted by universal values, sought to graft on modernity through the vehicle of the State. 
Divided culturally and ideologically, the elite was also divided at a political level over the 
control of posts within the machinery of the State, a struggle that was not without material 
considerations. The State used the francophones for their technical competence, giving them 
jobs in economic planning and administrative management, and used the arabophones in 
matters relating to culture and ideology: in teaching, in the ruling party, and in the media. The 
linguistic divide ran throughout the State machinery, including the army, but tended to be less 
strong at the summit of power probably because of a group solidarity amongst those involved. 
An illegitimate power depends upon its internal cohesion. 
But the arabophone elite, in contrast to the francophones, was not limited in size to those of its 
members who worked in the highest levels of the state apparatus. It was also strongly 
represented in society as a whole, where it clothed itself in a religious language which 
ordinary people could understand. Appearing frequently on television, the arabophone 
intellcctuals there defended social values in terms of religious morality and championed what 
political language in Algeria calls the national constants (ettawabit el watania), the 
ideological values upon which the nation was founded. These are principally two in number : 
the Arabic language and Islam. This discourse found its continuation in the mosque where, in 
time, it drifted, on one hand, towards demands about identity and, on the other, towards 
opposition against the State from a moral point of view. 
With the collapse of the managed economy, thought at the outset to provide legitimacy to 
those in power, the francophone elite found itself doubly discredited due to the fact that it had 
for long been identified with the economic policies of the State, providing them with scientific 
credibility. For example, the university economists, for the most part francophones, organized 
conferences and wrote articles and theses which showed the scientific basis of what became 
the dominant economic discourse recommending the "non-capitalist route to development, of 
socialism, of the system of controlled prices and of manufacturing industry". ([9]) By 
contrast, the arabophone elite, which had shown itself to be disinterested in the social 
problems of development, did not feel itself implicated in the economic failure and reaped the 
rewards for its cultural discourse. This position allowed it to move into opposition and to 
present itself as the ideological voice of the people in their opposition to the State, now 
accused of being controlled by francophones characterized as hizh frança (the party of 
France). Put schematically, the francophone was the organic intellectual identifying himself 
with a state which he wished to be the instrument of modernization and of social 
transformation; the arabophone, drawing upon a religious discourse, was a dissident who 
believed that this state corresponded in neither form nor substance to the cultural heritage of a 
society whose political expression he presumed to be. 
The Imam-teachers
The arabophone elite grew considerably in size due to the arabization of education and its 
democratization. Composed largely of teachers, this elite grew close to the population through 
the religious discussions that took place in the local mosques. After his classes, the teacher 
would frequent the mosque, lead evening prayers, and often lead discussions on the Koran, 
making references to current events, challenging the consciences of the believers and the 
responsibility of the country's leaders. These teachers, having volunteered to take on the role 
of imam, displayed certain specific characteristics: they were young (aged between 25-40), 
had not followed the traditional form of training in the teachings of the Koran, did not live off 
the generosity of the inhabitants of their district [10], and were virulently subversive in their 
sermons. Their impact and their authority over their local population derived from the 
religious form of their language and its aggressive stance towards the government and its 
Western allies who, according to them, sought to weaken Islamic morality through the 
liberalization of customs, most notably by means of the emancipation of women. What was 
new about this, therefore, was that in the recent past these moral criticisms had been voiced 
by old people who had been deeply respectful of tradition. The same moralistic discourse of 
the earlier Muslim cleric was henceforth to be delivered in a menacing, vigorous and 
aggressive tone, with a definite political goal, and was conveyed by young men who were by 
training teachers, doctors, engineers, technicians, and so on. Abbassi Madani, founder and 
president of the FIS, is a professor of educational psychology at the University of Algiers; Ali 
Belhadj, his deputy, teaches in an institute of higher education; Abdelkader Hachani. the man 
who replaced them after they were both arrested in June 1991, is an expert in hydrocarbons. 
Beyond their professional activities, they lead the evening prayers in their neighbourhood 
mosques and conduct debates on social themes (the role of women, justice, corruption in civil 
service, etc.) using a language that has drawn enormous crowds to them. They have built their 
fame upon an aggressive rhetoric directed against the government and based upon a religious 
rule of conduct. They have subsequently transcended their status as clercs and have become 
men of politics who, with the help of the crowds that follow them, seek to seize hold of the 
State in order, they specify, to ensure that it conforms to the dictates of morality. 
This part-time imam, who attracts the interest of believers who come to listen to him in the 
evening, is usually a government employee, either a teacher (ousted) in a school or university, 
a doctor (hakim) in a hospital, or an engineer (mouhandess) working in a state enterprise. He 
is not therefore a person without social position, with an irregular income and dependent upon 
the good nature of his neighbourhood, but rather he belongs to the privileged strata of society, 
possesses a house and car, and enjoys the salary of a government employee paid regularly into 
the bank. The authority conferred upon him by his function as imam is thus reinforced by a 
social status that identifies him with the francophones who, in the eyes of the faithful, have 
the pretension of monopolizing the attributes of social modernity. 
By the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, these imam- teachers had become 
important social phenomena. Invited to funerals and to marriage ceremonies, they preached 
their message, had it recorded on cassettes, to be listened to again and discussed in the home. 
Moreover, when this elite, born with independence, first interested itself in public affairs, 
social matters and the State, it became a political actor that, at the outset, the government 
underestimated because the latter presumed that it could bring this new phenomenon under 
control when the need arose. 
Entering into opposition towards the end of the 1980s, the imam-teachers presented 
themselves as dissident intellectuals, preaching the divine word, calling for solidarity and 
social justice, condemning corruption and the liberalization of morals, denouncing attacks on 
religion. If one can define the intellectual as an individual whose speech relates to social 
values and who finds an audience amongst a wider public, then these imam-teachers are 
intellectuals. But they are intellectuals in a society where the autonomy of politics has not 
been established, where religion has not been secularized, where the individual has not been 
set free from the communal mentality which imprisons him and refuses him his political 
liberty. The imam intellectuals have a public in a society where public opinion does not exist, 
if one understands by public opinion that political actor which changes parliamentary 
majorities and governments on a regular basis. The imam intellectuals are oppositional but not 
critical, because the critical analysis of social practices is rejected by the religious ideology, of 
which they are the bearers. This is why, at the level of government, they do not criticize either 
the idea of a one-party state or the supremacy of the army within its institutions. They oppose 
only the men who are in charge of those institutions and propose to replace them. Nor do they 
criticize society with a view to changing its social structure; they are reproachful only of the 
fact that it has become distanced from God, and propose to reverse the process. The imam-
teacher is therefore an oppositional intellectual who wants to become an organic intellectual 
within the movement for which he campaigns. But the religious dynamic is such, that there 
will always be oppositional clerics, even in a state which proclaims itself to be religious, 
because amongst Sunnite Muslims there exists no hierarchy which is the depository of 
religious authority. 
The francophones: A secularised elite
But why, beyond, his rhetorical skills, did Ali Belhadj, a figure emblematic of the imam-
teacher, become so popular and not, for example, Said Saadi, a doctor who entered politics, or 
even Norreddine Boukroh, a bilingual journalist who created a party making an appeal both, 
to Islam and to modernity? There are two reasons which can be given to explain the inability 
of these two figures to create popular political movements. The first is that they are perceived 
as having an ideological connection with the State, whose language has been that of Western 
modernity, and therefore as not having the potential to break with the FLN state. This 
impression was confirmed by the fact that the parties they created recruited their members 
essentially from social categories at the margin of the State: civil servants, technical 
specialists, doctors, lawyers, most of whom were French-speaking. The second season is that 
the secular character of their language – despite the fact that it was as critical of the 
government as that of the Islamists - associated them, in the eyes of ordinary people, as 
turning their back on religion. 
The so-called democratic parties have no support amongst the poorer sections of society 
because they all come up against the Islamic Utopia which encourages the popular masses to 
believe that it is possible to organize the State democratically upon the basis of a fear of God. 
If it is suggested that the fear of God is not sufficient to guarantee equality and social justice 
nor to prevent corruption and the abuse of power, the reply is that you do not sufficiently 
believe in God. The secular elite therefore finds itself faced with a conception of social 
relations according to which religious morality should be at the heart of those relations; it 
finds itself before a conception of politics where politics, at a formal level, cannot be 
autonomous from religious conscience. The assassination of francophone intellectuals can be 
explained in part by this moral conception of politics, a conception which they do not share. 
The ideology of democracy arouses suspicion from the moment that it is defended by a 
secular elite, especially when it is a largely French-speaking elite. This is not to say that, the 
masses who have voted recently in elections for the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) have voted 
against democracy. [11] In the FIS vote, there is beyond the desire to sanction those in power, 
a call for democracy that is formulated both implicitly and in a contradictory manner. The 
popularity of the FIS rests upon democratic demands that relate to participation in the world 
of politics from which Algerians are excluded, and that also relate to participation in the 
world of social modernity through such things as work, housing, the facilities associated with 
urban life, being treated with dignity by the administrative machinery of the State, and so on. 
Religion is perceived by the masses as the means of access to this modernity which respects 
their cultural identity. There is therefore a deep democratic impetus in the protests of the 
Islamists, but it is a protest which does not express itself in the normal words and language of 
democracy. 
This is why there is disagreement between the francophones and the populace, and this 
disagreement relates as much to the discourse of the francophones as to its secularized 
content. The people do not understand the arguments of the francophones, whilst the latter, in 
turn, do not understand that the people formulate their social hopes in religious terms. This 
mutual incomprehension is a measure of the distance that exists between an elite which 
wishes that the social aspirations of the people be formulated in a secularized discourse, and a 
people who do not understand that the elite - or a part of the elite - does not give an important 
place to religion in its political discourse. This mutual incomprehension between the two 
entities willl last until the point that it is dispelled by historical experience, that is, up to the 
point that the FIS exercises power. It is only the defeat of the FIS and its incapacity to keep its 
promises, and therefore the incapacity of religious discourse to ensure equality and the dignity 
towards which the people aspire, which will bring about a rejection of religious discourse in 
political struggles. I have called this process through which the Islamists will lose their 
popularity one of "fruitful regression". [12] The error of the secular elite was not to remain 
democratic in January 1992, when they should have opposed the annulment of the elections 
and denounced the torture and arbitrary imprisonment that was being inflicted upon the 
Islamists. The vote of December 1991 was a vote whose effects would in time have brought 
the people nearer to the secular elite. The quashing of the elections, by contrast, created an 
infernal dynamic which has further distanced this elite from the populace for what will be a 
long period, and to incomprehension has been added hatred and the feelings of revenge. 
The violence which broke out brought into stark confrontation the State, supported by the 
army, and the Islamists, enthused by their electoral victory. Those social groups at the 
periphery of the State – doctors, journalists, technical specialists, French-speaking teachers, in 
short, all those that in Algeria are called intellectuals - had to decide what side they were on. 
Their ambiguity was that, whilst they were hostile to the Islamists, they did not unduly 
demonstrate their support for the army. It is from this that questions and doubts arm about the 
authors of the killings each time an intellectual is murdered in Algiers. 
The isolation of the francophone 
intellectuals
But the killing of francophone intellectuals has been - and is - only possible because there 
does not exist a university system that can be seen to be autonomous of the State and which, 
consequently, can gain credibility amongst different publics. It is precisely because the 
francophone intellectuals are not politically and professionally credible and do not have a 
public, that they can be killed like rabbits. The systematic policy of the leaders of the newly-
independent state to combat any slight desire for autonomy in society – be it economic, 
religious, in the trade unions, universities or the press - gave the francophone elite no chance 
of being credible in the eyes of the population. Such an elite, emerging independently of the 
State, could have provided an alternative to the language of religion, or at least limited its 
hegemonic influence over a society which, in order to show its distrust of government, took 
refuge in the politics of Islam. 
The assassination of intellectuals has not evoked a disapproval from the population which 
might have persuaded the murderers not to commit further crimes. This shows the position 
that intellectuals have in their society. The funerals of the victims, exploited by state 
television as a weapon of propaganda against the Islamists, confirms the average viewer in the 
belief that the deceased was a supporter of the government. In a programme devoted to the 
murder of intellectuals broadcast in May 1994, the arabophone writer Tahar Ouettar replied to 
a question, addressed to him by a journalist from the Arte channel, that the death of Tabar 
Djaout was a loss for his own children and for France, but not for Algeria. [13] Beyond what 
this horrible phrase tells us of the hatred which exists between Algerians, the fact that Tahar 
Ouettar was not rebuked by a wider public for having murdered Tahar Djaout for a second 
time, says much about the isolation of the francophone intellectual in Algeria. 
The origin of this isolation lies in the existence of a political domain that is dominated in a 
coercive and non-ideological manner by the power of the State, which itself is in the hands of 
the army. This has prevented the emergence of civil elites, with the exception of those social 
groups that it employs within its institutions and in the economic sector, where, in any case, it 
exercises power. Even the university is prevented from producing its own elite, being refused 
its own administrative autonomy and facing opposition from the government towards its 
reviews and research groups. The rectors of universities - up to the end of the 1980s recruited 
from amongst doctors and dentists - and of educational institutes were chosen by the relevant 
government ministry, after consultation with the army, for their willingness slavishly to serve 
the administrative hierarchy of the State. The principal concern was that the university system 
should not be a focus of opposition, having elites with which different levels of the population 
would self-identify. The universities being blocked off, the oppositional elites emerged from 
the mosques and in such numbers that they were difficult to control. [14]
But it would be an exaggeration to say that the power of the State alone has prevented the 
emergence of a secular elite because, in point of fact, the development of such an elite has 
faced obstacles of a historical, social and ideological kind. Rather, the State has not sought to 
encourage the emergence of an elite possessing social recognition. It has not aided this 
process because it feared that this elite would be a competitor to the army, the only institution 
conceived as providing members for the ruling elite. 
Fundamentally, a politically relevant elite cannot be formed before there appears a public 
opinion operating in a political space that is occupied by political parties, trade unions, 
associations and newspapers offering both opinion and information. Certainly, public opinion, 
in the sense of a homogenous political actor obeying a political rationality and reacting as an 
individual, has never existed. [15] However, what is commonly called public opinion is that 
collection of different currents of opinion that cross civil society, united around a minimum 
consensus concerning the procedures of accession to power and the legitimacy of opposition. 
Public opinion does not express itself through a single party or movement, nor necessarily 
through a series of parties. Public opinion does not indicate the degree of cohesion or 
integration of a society, but only that a consensus exists about the way in which differences in 
society are addressed. Electoral opinion is an illustration of the existence of public opinion as 
a determining element in the political sphere and domain. 
The force of the intellectual derives from his ability to influence public opinion. If the latter 
does not formally exist, if it does not intervene on a regular basis so as to change the 
occupants of power, the intellectual remains the individual respected in his neighbourhood for 
his social status – doctor, journalist, lawyer, university lecturer, and so on – and not as a 
political actor who influences public debate in the direction of modernity. It is here that 
resides the principal difference between the intellectual who is critical of the social structure 
and its forms of collective representation and the oppositional intellectual. The francophone 
intellectual is critical in a society obsessed by the defence of its cultural identity; the 
arabophone intellectual is oppositional in a country where the political regime has been 
rejected. The isolation of the one and the popularity of the other have the same cause: the 
majority of the population want to change the personnel of the political regime without 
putting into question the collective and symbolic forms inherited from the past. It is through 
this fundamental contradiction that society will modernize itself, unhappily at the price of 
terrible suffering, because nowhere does the unfolding of history conform to reason and 
intelligence, which alone are capable of saving suffering. 
Article translated by Jeremy Jennings. 
Notes 
 
 
[1] This chapter is a revised version of a paper presented to the annual seminar of Centre 
d'Analyse et d'Intervention Sociologique (CADIS), held between 22-24 September 1994 in 
Dourban, and first published in Esprit, January 1995, p. 130-8. I thank the participants of this 
seminar and especially A. Bérolowitch, N. Guénif, Y. Pozo and L. Zhang, for their comments. 
[2] Antonio Gramsci used this expression to characterize those persons who, because of their 
skills and knowledge, were recruited by the capitalist state in order to ensure the dominance 
of bourgeois ideology.  
[3] "The drama of Russian society and the drama of those who consider themselves as 
belonging to the intelligentsia lies in the long and painful passage from infantilism to 
maturity... It is understandable that the confusion of those who call themselves democrats 
should open the door to the most obscure and dangerous forces. If democracy does not 
possess its cultural and moral elite it will become an oligarchy, an adventurist political 
dictatorship that will mobilize the masses and manipulate them." (J.A. Levada, « Le problème 
de l'intelligentsia dans la Russie aujourd'hui ».) I thank A. Bérélowitch for having drawn this 
unpublished text my attention. 
[4] See. J. Benda, La Trahison des clercs, Paris, Grasset, 1927. See also R. Debray, Le 
Pouvoir intellectuel en France, Paris, Grasset, 1979. Benda's text can be found as The 
Betrayal of the Intellectuals, Boston, Beacon Press, 1955; whilst Debray's text has been 
translated as Teachers. Writers, and Celebrities: The Intellectuals of Modern France. London, 
Verso, 1981, 
[5] See M. Gallo, "Les intellectuels, la politique et la modernité", Le Monde, 24 July 1983. 
[6] See B. Stora and Z. Daoud, Ferhat Abbas, Paris, Fayard, 1994. 
[7] There were arabophones who were sensitive to questions of development, but they were 
not numerous. For example, the editorial board of the arabophone newspaper Al-Khabar was 
not attracted to the language of the Arabo-Islamists. The Islamists made fun of the paper by 
calling it the arabophone publication of the francophones, 
[8] A policy of bilingualism might have overcome this division, but after independence it was 
shelved as being too problematic. 
[9] Inspired by the ideas of the French academic G. Destanne de Bernis, it was this strategy 
that directed Algerian economic policy to the 1970s. The model showed that for a country 
such as Algeria it was better to begin by developing heavy industry rather than the light 
industry that would produce consumer goods.  
[10] Under colonialism, the imam of the mosque who lived in urban areas was dependent 
upon the charity of his neighbourhood. 
[11] For a more detailed assessment of the situation, see L. Addi "Democrats caught in the 
crossfire", The Times Higher Educational Supplement, 10 November 1995; L. Addi, 
« Dynamique infernale en Algérie », Le Monde diplomatique, October 1995; and L, Addi. 
« Dynamique et contradictions du système politique algérien », Le Monde 29 November 1995. 
[12] See L. Addi, L'Algérie et la démocratie. Paris, La Découverte, 1994, and "Islam and 
Democracy", in H. Adenius (ed.), Democracy's Victory and Crisis, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1996, forthcoming. 
[13] Tahar Djouat was a poet and founder of the weekly review Ruptures (eds). 
[14] For an assessment of the attacks of Islamic fundamentalists upon university personnel, 
see S. Hughes. "Rector murdered by Islamic hitmen", The Times Higher Education 
Supplement, 10 June 1994 (eds). 
[15] See P. Bourdieu. « L'opinion publique n'existe pas », Les Temps modernes, 318, January 
1973, pp. 1292-1309. 
